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Private Enforcement of the Kansas Wage
Payment Act
Joseph A. Schremmer*
Sean M. McGivern**
No man is above the law and no man is below it . . . .
—Theodore Roosevelt

I.

1

INTRODUCTION

We are practitioners, and in our practice we meet with many prospective
clients who have worked, for a wage, but have not been paid by their
employers. Unfortunately, there is nothing we as private lawyers can do for
a majority of these people. The problem is not that the law provides no
relief. Kansas, in fact, has a set of statutes on the books that makes it illegal
for employers to fail to pay their wage-earning employees and penalizes
violators. These laws, known as the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA or
Act), however, are not adequately enforced. For this reason, we argue here,
the law should incentivize private enforcement. The most effective means
of doing so is to amend the KWPA to include an attorney fee shift that
favors prevailing plaintiffs, i.e., prevailing employees.
In the status quo, the KWPA provides for two mechanisms of
enforcement. First, the state of Kansas, through the Kansas Department of
Labor (KDOL), is authorized to investigate and adjudicate employee wage
complaints administratively. Second, the KWPA provides a private cause
action for individual employees who are aggrieved under the Act. Even
together these enforcement mechanisms have proved unable to vindicate a
substantial number of Kansas employees victimized by wage theft. The
*
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Kansas School of Law, 2013.
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1. President’s Message at the Opening of the Second Session of the Fifty-Eighth Congress,
Dec. 7, 1903, in 1 The Roosevelt Policy: Speeches, Letters and State Papers, Relating to Corporate
Wealth and Closely Allied Topics 191, 196 (William Griffith ed., 1919).
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problem with the administrative enforcement mechanism is that it is
underutilized. The KDOL simply does not investigate and prosecute a
significant number of wage complaints.
Because the right to an
administrative hearing depends on the agency’s initial determination that an
actual dispute exists, the agency tends to refer complainants to private
lawyers.
Private enforcement is also problematic in the status quo. Wage
payment claims are typically small, ranging from miniscule to modest in
most cases. Rarely is a claim worth more than a few thousand dollars. As a
consequence, the costs of prosecuting a lawsuit to recover the owed wages
and penalties quickly add up to more than the total potential recovery. The
chief driver of legal costs, of course, is attorney fees. Because aggrieved
employees are, by definition, wage earners who have not been paid their
wages, virtually all wage payment cases are taken on a contingency fee
basis. Lawyers have no economic incentive to take cases on contingency
when the total potential recovery is likely to be less than the lawyer’s fees.
Lawyers, therefore, have no economic incentive to take a large portion of
wage payment cases, and the KWPA is poorly enforced as a result.
Two recent examples from our practice illustrate this problem. Within
about one month’s time, we had two prospective clients call our office with
potential wage payment claims. Client A had been fired from his job and
not paid all of his earned wages by his former employer. Client A had a
written employment contract with his employer that permitted the prevailing
party in any dispute over the contract to recover his reasonable attorney fee.
Client B had left his job and was also owed wages in comparable amounts to
Client A. Client B, unlike A, was an at-will employee with no written
employment contract and no attorney fee shift. We could afford to take
Client A’s case because of the potential for fee recovery. We had to decline
B’s case.
Client A and Client B were similarly situated in every way except the
fee shift. Each had been taken advantage of in the same way and for nearly
the same amount of money. Yet redress was possible only for one. As to
the other, the KWPA went unenforced. This is a problem with the law.
But lawyers are creative. For every prospective client like Client B
whose wage payment case we have declined, there is a Client C for whom
we have tried, sometimes vainly, to seek relief under a different, less
applicable statute that allows for attorney fee recovery (often the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)). There is little sense in stretching the facts of
a case to fit a mostly inapposite law when there is a law directly on point.
Yet this is what lawyers across the state are forced to attempt when
approached with a legitimate but unenforceable wage payment claim.
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The argument of this article is that there should be greater private
enforcement of the KWPA, and that this goal can be achieved by amending
the KWPA to include an attorney fee shifting provision that awards
prevailing plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fee. A fee shift is necessary
for three reasons. First, without a fee shift, deserving employees are unfairly
barred from enforcing their wage payment claims in court. Second, an
attorney fee shift is necessary to give meaning to the rights granted by the
KWPA, which are rendered hollow by the lack of enforcement under the
present system. And third, deputizing individual employees to enforce the
KWPA privately would not only improve enforcement, but would do so at
the expense of the violators of the law rather than the expense of the State of
Kansas.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, we discuss the history and
public policy underlying the KWPA and briefly explain the operation of the
law, including the administrative enforcement mechanism. In Part III, we
synthesize the literature on the rationales for and effects on litigation of
attorney fee shifts. We pay particular attention to the private attorney
general doctrine, developed by the United States Supreme Court in
connection with the Civil Rights Act and adopted by Kansas courts in
various contexts. In Part IV, we set forth the types of fee shifts found in the
wage payment and collection statutes of other states as part of a survey of all
fifty states and the District of Columbia. Part IV shows that Kansas is in a
small minority as a state with a comprehensive wage payment and collection
law without an attorney fee shift. Part V sets forth our argument for why, in
light of the purpose and public policy of the KWPA, as well as the
theoretical and practical reasons for attorney fee shifts, the KWPA should be
amended to include an attorney fee provision. In Part V, we propose
specific language for the attorney fee shift. We conclude in Part VI.

II. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE KANSAS
WAGE PAYMENT ACT
Kansas attorneys receive calls almost daily from people who want to
pursue wages unfairly withheld, deducted, or never paid by their employers.
In most instances, the amount in controversy is small—ranging from $20 to
$2,000. Such modest amounts are generally insufficient to justify a
contingency fee based representation, especially in the typical case when the
employer possesses most of the relevant documents. And because the
disputed funds are wages, a retainer or hourly fee arrangement is out of the
question.
These concerns motivated the Kansas Legislature in 1973 to pass the
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Kansas Wage Payment Act.2 At the time, Kansas was “near the bottom
among most states insofar as the existence of any effective remedies for
employed persons in the employer-employee relationship.”3 Only 40% of
the individuals employed in Kansas could claim the minimum wage
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).4 Moreover, to the
extent that a “prompt payment” requirement is read into the FLSA, such a
requirement only applies to the statutory minimum wage and not generally
to all earned wages due.5
In the early 1970s, the Kansas Attorney General’s office regularly
received calls about withheld wages. Such claims “were usually small and
therefor [sic] the complainants couldn’t afford an attorney. There was
nothing [the Kansas Attorney General’s] office could do, and this legislation
was needed.”6 Sample grievances included a 7-Eleven store in Emporia that
docked an employee’s pay for returned customer checks, and a restaurant
that withheld shortages from the pay of all employees who had access to the
cash register during the relevant shift.7 House Member T. McCune likened
employer withholdings to unlawful garnishments.8 That was no small
concern at the time, as the United States Supreme Court had just struck
down a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute in 1969.9 The Court
said such a prejudgment garnishment “may as a practical matter drive a
wageearning family to the wall.”10
Practices like these contravene “the most basic precept of employeremployee relations, [which] is that employees be paid their earned wages, in
full, in money, and without delay.”11 To this end, the KWPA provides, as its
overarching principal, that employers must timely “pay all wages due” to

2. Kansas Wage Payment Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-301 to 44-340 (West 2014).
3. An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H.
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. 2 (Kan. 1973) (statement of T. McCune,
Member, House of Representatives).
4. Id. at 1.
5. See, e.g., Craig Becker, The Check Is in the Mail: Timely Payment Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1250 (1993).
6. An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H.
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. i (Kan. 1973) (statement of Jerry Finnell,
Attorney General’s Office).
7. Id. at 6 (statement of T. McCune, Member, House of Representatives).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).
10. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341–42 (1969).
11. An Act Providing for Wage Payment and Collection: Hearing on H.B. 1429 Before H.
Comm. On Labor & Industry, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. 2 (Kan. 1973) (statement of T. McCune,
Member, House of Representatives).
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employees, and that employers may not “withhold, deduct, or divert any
portion of an employee’s wages” except for limited, approved reasons.12 For
willful violations, the KWPA imposes a penalty of 1% per day for late
payment, up to 100% of the unpaid wage.13 Put more simply, an employer
that willfully fails to pay an employee all earned wages due is liable to the
employee for up to twice the amount of the owed wages.
Although the specifics of how the KWPA operates and has been
interpreted exceed the scope of our analysis here,14 it will help to summarize
the key provisions of the law. They are as follows:
 “Wages” are defined as compensation for labor or services
rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined
on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis, less
authorized withholding and deductions.15 The regulations add
that the term includes all agreed compensation for services for
which the conditions required for entitlement, eligibility,
accrual, or earning have been met by the employee.16
 Employers must pay employees “all wages due” at least once a
month, on regular paydays designated in advance by the
employer.17
 In the event of disputes about wages owed, employers must pay
all undisputed wages and fight about only the disputed
portion.18
 The law defines permissible and impermissible deductions from
employees’ compensation.19 The most frequently litigated
issue here is whether the deductions are authorized by the
employee, in writing, “for a lawful purpose accruing to the
benefit of the employee.”20
 The KWPA imposes personal liability on officers and agents of
12. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-314(a), 44-319(a) (West 2014).
13. Id. §44-315(b).
14. For a thorough and well-done primer on the KWPA, see generally Boyd A. Byers &
Carolyn L. Rumfelt, See Dick and Jane Work: A Kansas Wage Payment Act Primer, KAN. J. B.A.,
Oct. 2003, at 14.
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-313(c) (West 2014).
16. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-20-1(d). This includes profit-sharing compensation. Id.
17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-314(a) (West 2014).
18. Id. § 44-316(a).
19. Id. § 44-319. Section 44-319 was recently amended to clarify that certain withholdings are
permissible, including withholdings for unreturned merchandise or uniforms, when supported by a
written agreement. Id.
20. Id. § 44-319(a)(3).
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the employer who knowingly allow the employer to violate
the law.21
Kansas courts have often noted the uncommon strength of the public
policy supporting the KWPA. In Coma Corp. v. Kansas Department of
Labor, the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed “the strong and longtime
Kansas public policy of protecting wages and wage earners.”22 The Coma
Corp. court went on to set forth a bit of the history of Kansas’s public policy
regarding wages:
[T]hroughout the history of this state, the protection of wages and wage
earners has been a principal objective of many of our laws. See, for
example, K.S.A. 60–2307, originally enacted as G.S. 1868, ch. 38, § 6,
providing that otherwise exempt personal property shall not be exempt
from attachment or execution for wages; K.S.A. 44–312, enacted in
1901, giving preference to the payment of wages in the case of
receiverships or assignments for the benefit of creditors; the statute
restricting garnishment of wages, K.S.A. 60–2310, which reflects the
rationale of G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 490; and the wage payment act, K.S.A.
44–313 et seq., enacted in 1973. K.S.A. 40–3103, like the statutes
mentioned above, gives preference to wage earners, in order that they
23
and the families dependent upon them are not destitute.

In addition to the strict remedies under the KWPA, certain other
provisions illustrate the importance of the policy behind the law. No right
under the KWPA can be contravened, set aside, or waived unless it is raised
in court or administrative proceedings of the KDOL.24 Accordingly, an
employer cannot require an employee to sign a release to receive wages;
such a release is null and void.25 In a recent opinion, the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas held that a previous FLSA collective
action settlement was legally incapable of compromising the KWPA claims
of identical class members.26 The KWPA’s coverage even extends to

21. Id. § 44-323(b); Traffas v. Bridge Capital Investors II, No. CIV. A. 90-1304 MLB, 1993
WL 339293 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1993) aff’d sub nom. Traffas v. Bridge Capital Corp., 46 F.3d 1152
(10th Cir. 1995); State ex rel. McCain v. Erdman, 607 P.2d 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
22. 154 P.3d 1080, 1092 (Kan. 2007); see also A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res.,
144 P.3d 760 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
23. Coma Corp., 154 P.3d at 1092 (quoting Burriss v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 691 P.2d 10,
16 (Kan. 1984)).
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-321, 44-324(a), (b) (West 2014).
25. Id. § 44-316(b). The only exception that exists is for “binding settlement agreements,”
which are supervised by the KDOL. Id. § 44-316(b); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-20-1(c).
26. Allen v. Mill-Tel, Inc., No. 11-1143-EFM-KGS, 2012 WL 2872160 (D. Kan. July 12,
2012).
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undocumented immigrants.27 What is more, courts have recognized a tort
claim to vindicate employees who are terminated in retaliation for exercising
rights under the KWPA.28
The KWPA sets up an administrative process within the KDOL for
employees to pursue remedies under the Act.29 Employees initiate the
process by submitting written complaints on KDOL-prescribed forms.30 The
KDOL affords claimants a hearing only after various prerequisites are met,
including, importantly, an investigator’s determination that an actual dispute
exists.31 The Office of Administrative Hearings conducts the hearings, and
attorneys are allowed to participate.32 After a hearing, the presiding officer
prepares written findings of fact and conclusions of law and awards
appropriate damages and penalties.33 The presiding officer’s order becomes
final if not timely appealed to the Secretary of Labor.34 There is a
mechanism for the Secretary of Labor to enforce wage orders for the benefit
of the employee.35
The problem with the administrative process is that bureaucrats must
consider individual rights alongside other, competing factors.36 Anecdotal
evidence, collected in the course of the authors’ practice and in preparation
of this article, suggests the KDOL’s mandate to enforce the KWPA is not
being fulfilled. For example, the authors’ firm regularly consults with
prospective clients about wage payment and collection issues. Some of
these individuals have worthy claims, and we refer them to the KDOL.
They often call back after the KDOL determines there is a lack of evidence
to pursue the case, or says there is no claim, or suggests that the person hire
a private lawyer. But small individual cases, even when obviously

27. Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080 (Kan. 2007).
28. Campbell v. Husky Hogs, L.L.C., 255 P.3d 1, 3 (Kan. 2011) (recognizing tort claim). But
see Deeds v. Waddell & Reed Inv. Mgmt. Co., 280 P.3d 786, 792 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
employee’s complaints were too equivocal to invoke protections of the KWPA).
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a (West 2014).
30. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-21-1.
31. Id. § 49-21-2(b)(8).
32. KAN. DEP’T LABOR, Kansas Wage Payment Act Hearing Procedure,
http://www.dol.ks.gov/Laws/hearing.aspx (last visited May 11, 2014). See KAN. ADMIN. REGS.
§ 49-21-2 for the applicable procedure.
33. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 49-21-3(d) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a(b) (West 2014).
34. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-322a(b) (West 2014).
35. Id. § 44-324(b)–(d).
36. Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008)
(describing the various concerns that motivate administrative agencies in enforcing private rights);
Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167,
193 (1985) (explaining the inefficiency of agency enforcement).
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meritorious, make no sense for private lawyers to take without an attorney
fee shift. The costs of prosecuting a small wage claim simply exceed the
value of the claim, making the lawsuit uneconomic for the lawyer. In one
particular situation from the authors’ practice, the KDOL advised it would
not take any additional cases against a particular employer because of the
employer’s risk of insolvency.37
Because it is uneconomic to bring small wage payment claims, current
KWPA litigation predominately involves sizeable individual claims and
large aggregations of relatively small claims.38 Individual employees with
small, non-class claims for unpaid wages are left between a rock and a hard
place. These individuals frequently lack the funds to hire a lawyer because
their employer wrongfully withheld wages. And private lawyers have no
incentive to take these cases on a contingency fee basis without an attorney
fee shift. In most cases, there is no reason to pursue a representative action
on their behalves. Meanwhile, the KDOL is apparently unable to bear the
weight of enforcing the KWPA without the aid of private causes of action.
The result is a law that courts claim is extremely important but that is very
easy to break with impunity.
Many other states have solved this problem by providing for an award

37. This is not to suggest that the KDOL is unmotivated or lacking in good faith. That is not
our opinion. Rather, the agency has its own prerogatives and cannot be expected to fill the roles of
both advocate and judge. We believe the KDOL’s efforts can be, and should be, supplemented by
more private wage collection litigation to both ease the agency’s burden and improve enforcement of
the law.
38. See, e.g., Critchlow v. Barcas Field Servs., No. 13–CV–01404–JAR–KMH, 2014 WL
1664819 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2014) (alleging violations of the KWPA by failing to pay 5% of net
proceeds on a $47 million sale of a company); Sibley v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 254 F.R.D. 662, 669
(D. Kan. 2008) (certifying class claims of thousands of individuals to pursue underpaid commission
claims).
Kansas federal courts have recently made aggregate actions for wage claims easier. In
Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the District of Kansas permitted the plaintiffs to pursue a Rule 23 class
action for unpaid wages under the KWPA based on principles under the FLSA relating to
compensable time. Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1187 (D. Kan. 2011) (“Thus,
to the extent it is determined at trial that Tyson is required under the FLSA to compensate its
employees for certain activities or time periods for which Tyson has not been compensating
employees, then the KWPA class in this case may recover those amounts under the KWPA.”).
Garcia is significant because the representative action provisions of the FLSA require individual
class members to provide written consent to join the case, whereas traditional Rule 23 actions
include all defined class members until they opt out from the case. Brown v. Money Tree Mortg.,
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 676, 678–79 (D. Kan. 2004). As a result, plaintiffs can now vindicate FLSA rights
through KWPA class actions brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 or appropriate state counterparts such
as K.S.A. § 60-223. Since Garcia, the District of Kansas has expanded Garcia to state,
categorically, that plaintiffs can rely on the FLSA as a legal basis for KWPA claims. Tarcha v.
Rockhurst Univ. Continuing Educ. Ctr., Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-2487-KHV, 2012 WL 1998782, at *4
(D. Kan. June 4, 2012).
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of attorney fees to a prevailing employee in a wage action.39 Kansas has
solved similar problems in other contexts by inserting attorney fee shifts into
remedial statutory schemes.40 Oddly, the KWPA allows for recovery of
attorney fees—but only for the KDOL. Private plaintiffs have no such
attorney fee shift.41 As originally proposed in 1973, the KWPA contained a
fee shift for prevailing plaintiffs.42 The provision was deleted in the first
round of revisions, however, as a political necessity to secure support for
passage of the bill.43
Passage of the bill was no small feat. In fact, organized labor had tried
to introduce wage collection legislation in the six previous legislative
sessions.44 Jim Parrish, a freshman Democrat member of the Kansas House
of Representatives in 1972, reached out to the Kansas Association of
Commerce and Industry (the antecedent to the Kansas Chamber of
Commerce) to improve the bill’s chances of passage.45 The bill passed the
House of Representatives and was referred to two separate committees in the
Senate, which is often considered the “kiss of death.”46 By making
concessions, such as the attorney fee provision, however, Representative
Parrish and his colleagues were able to eventually pass the bill.

III. INTRODUCTION TO THE RATIONALES FOR AND EFFECTS OF
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING IN LITIGATION
A great deal has been written about whether, how, and why attorney fee
shifting affects litigation.47 It is generally agreed that fee shifting in fact

39. See infra Part IV & Appendix A.
40. See, e.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-643(e) (West 2014);
Kansas Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1211 (West 2014); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-908 (West 2014) (making attorney fees available in certain insurance cases); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2006 (West 2014) (attorneys fees taxed as costs in certain actions involving
negligent motor vehicle operation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (West 2014) (allowing state civil
service board to award attorney fees for whistleblower act violations).
41. Id. § 44-324(c); Shelley v. Dep’t of Human Res., 723, 8 P.3d 33, 39 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that prevailing individuals cannot recover attorney fees under the KWPA, but the
government can).
42. H.B. 1429, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess. (Kan. 1973).
43. Interview with Jim Parrish, former Kansas Representative (May 3, 2014).
44. Id.
45. Letter from James W. Parrish to Boyd A. Byers & Carolyn L. Rumfelt (October 30, 2003)
(on file with author).
46. Id.
47. John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, Or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember
the Coase Theorum, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1991) (noting the “immense
literature analyzing this question” in 1991).
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influences parties’ strategic litigation decisions. Far from a comprehensive
literature review, the following attempts to synthesize and summarize
relevant thought in the area of allocation of legal expenses. Specifically, the
succeeding paragraphs introduce the concept of designing rules for
allocating legal expenses to achieve desired levels of litigation as well as the
most typical types of rules in existence.

A. The Importance of Cost Allocation to Levels of Litigation
The financial costs of litigation are significant.48 It is even possible, as
Richard Posner points out, for parties’ combined litigation expenditures to
exceed the stakes of the litigation.49 Indeed, many of our courts’ procedural
rules can be understood as designed to allocate costs to increase the
productivity of the parties’ expenditures.50 It follows that the allocation of
legal expenditures can influence the behaviors of parties and outcomes in
litigation.51 Expense considerations are integral to parties’ decision making
in litigation, including decisions whether to bring suit and, if so, whether to
settle or go to trial.52 As one commentator put it, in litigation, “cost
considerations intrude with every move the attorney makes for his client.”53
Because allocation of legal expenses influences the decisions of
litigants, different systems of expense allocation cause different levels of
litigation.54 In designing cost allocation rules (like attorney fee shifting
rules) for an area of law, therefore, it is necessary first to determine whether
and how the current level of litigation in the particular area should be
changed.55 For instance, in areas of the law in which litigation is desirable,
legal costs should be allocated to incentivize parties to litigate.56
One situation in which increased levels of litigation are desirable is
where the expense of vindicating a right or entitlement is greater than many
of the holders of the right can bear. In other words, it is desirable to increase
litigation in areas in which potential plaintiffs lack access to legal remedies

48. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1313, 1338–39 (2012).
49. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 21.10, at 613 (7th ed. 2007).
50. Id. at 611.
51. See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, & Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. L. STUD. 55 (1982).
52. See generally id.
53. Neil J. Williams, Fee Shifting & Public Interest Litigation, ABA J., June 1978, at 859, 860.
54. Shavell, supra note 51, at 71.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 73.
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because they lack sufficient liquid assets to pay the legal fees necessary to
pursue their claims.57 As Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein have
observed, “When an entitlement holder does not have the financial
wherewithal to vindicate the entitlement in court, the entitlement will fail to
protect her regardless of its classification as a right in personam or a right in
rem.”58 Simply, an individual will not sue to vindicate her right if she
cannot afford to do so. As a consequence, the right will fail to accomplish
its purpose.59 Richard Posner, discussing contingent fees as a means of
access to legal remedies for illiquid individual plaintiffs,60 has noted, “The
likelier a suit is to be brought if there is a violation of law that causes injury,
the greater is the deterrent effect of whatever legal principle the suit would
enforce, and hence the less likely are potential defendants to engage in the
forbidden conduct.”61 Thus, increased litigation can aid in the enforcement
of legal rights and entitlements both by increasing the opportunities for
rights holders to vindicate their rights and by deterring potential defendants
from encroaching on those rights in the first place.62
While incentivizing, or disincentivizing, litigants to pursue litigation
57. See generally POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11 (discussing access to legal remedies through
contingent fees, class actions, and indemnity of legal fees).
58. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1338.
59. It is almost axiomatic, but from a policy perspective it is desirable to enforce rights. Per
Parchomovsky and Stein,
Loss of entitlements on account of high enforcement costs should alarm policymakers for
several reasons. First, and most obviously, it harms the entitlement holder. Rights
theorists may disagree whether the harm is to her personhood, autonomy, or wellbeing,
but none will contest the fact that she suffered some serious harm. Second, entitlement
erosion undermines the goals of society at large since it upsets the balance of powers and
freedoms within society. After all, entitlements are granted for a reason and their
systematic non-enforcement therefore impairs policymaking. Third, the possibility of
’entitlements’ erosion creates a perverse incentive for third parties to deliberately intrude
on ’others’ entitlements. Correspondingly, it induces inefficient changes in the behavior
of entitlement holders who foresee the possibility that they will not be able to enforce
their legal rights and privileges.
Id. at 1333.
60. Providing access to legal remedies through litigation is one purpose of contingent fee
contracts, class actions suits, and attorney fee shifting rules. See POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11. In
a sense, all three are procedures for allocation of legal expenses.
61. Id. at 615.
62. A system that allocates all of the costs of litigation to a right holder’s opposing party if the
right holder succeeds in vindicating her right would reduce the costs of enforcement and, logically,
incentivize the right holder to bring suit. Such a system would thereby increase the level of
litigation. The inverse is also true. A system in which the parties’ legal costs were allocated to the
right holder if she failed in vindicating her right would decrease the level of litigation. See Shavell,
supra note 51, at 55 (evaluating the economic effects of different fee shifting systems to determine
which increase and decrease the number of suits brought and number of settlements reached in lieu
of trial).
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appears to be a prevalent rationale for cost allocation schemes, it is not the
only one. As writers in the area have noted, there are myriad reasons
policymakers and judges might choose a particular cost allocation system,
and the reasons are not always clear.63 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., for example,
has identified six common rationales underpinning systems of allocating
attorney fees.64 These rationales include indemnifying the winner based on
simple fairness, making the winner truly whole, deterring misconduct,
rewarding “private attorneys general,” and affecting the relative strengths of
the parties.65 We will explain each of Rowe’s rationales in more detail
below as they relate to our discussion of the major schemes of cost
allocation.

B. Schemes of Litigation Cost Allocation
Only a few common cost allocation schemes exist. Broadly, these fall
into two categories: non-fee-shifting, known as the “American rule,” and
fee-shifting. The fee-shifting category can be subdivided into the indemnity
system and one-way shifting systems.66 In the following subsections, we
will briefly describe each common system of cost allocation, paying
particular attention to the rationales underlying each system and each
system’s effect on litigation levels.

1. The American, Non-Fee-Shifting System
In American jurisdictions, litigants pay their own legal costs, win or
lose, absent a contrary statute or judge-made exception.67 This method of
63. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651–52, 658 (1982) (“There exist, indeed, several different sorts of
reasons why a legal system might choose a policy of requiring losing litigants to pay winners’ legal
fees in some or all cases.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries:
Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 445 (1986) (“The justification for imposing strict fee
liability upon a litigant merely because he loses is less clear, however.”); John Leubsdorf, Toward a
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1984)
(“As far back as one can trace, courts in this country have allowed winning litigants to recovery their
litigation costs from losers only to the extent provided by the legislature. But closer examination
reveals that the justification of this rule and its significance in the economy of litigation have varied
over the years.”).
64. Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 651–53.
65. Id. at 653.
66. See Shavell, supra note 51, at 55 (identifying the non-shifting “American system,” the
indemnity, or “British system,” one-way shifting in favor of defendant, and one-way shifting in
favor of plaintiff as common methods of cost allocation).
67. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “American rule”);
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1363. The so-called American rule supposedly emerged
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allocation of legal expenses has been termed the “American rule.”68 The
American rule is anomalous. It is unique in the common law world,69 and
differs from the predominant system in Continental Europe.70 The exact
origins of the American rule are somewhat mysterious.71 Early colonial
legislation provided for fee recovery in conformity with the English system
of indemnity.72 But as attorney fees were deregulated in the decades
following the American Revolution, the pay-your-own-way system came to
dominate.73 Since taking hold around the nineteenth century, the American
rule has withstood numerous significant statutory and common law
exceptions.74
The American rule is considered to generally encourage litigation as
compared to systems that indemnify the winner’s fees.75 The American rule
has been criticized for promoting “wasteful litigation expenditures.”76 The
instance of nuisance suits is, theoretically at least, likely higher under the
American system.77 The other side of the coin, however, is that the
from the early United States Supreme Court opinion of Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306
(1796). Dobbs, supra note 63, at 435 n.2. The Arcambel Court held simply that $1,600 in counsel’s
fees, which the lower court had permitted the winner to recover as part of his damages, was not
properly recoverable. Arcambel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306. The Court stated, without explanation,
“The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not
strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute.” Id. Despite this pronouncement from the early Court, the law in the United States on
attorney fee recovery was not clear. Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 15. The “rule” from Arcambel
would have had little if any authority, “since at that time federal courts did not play a creative role
but followed state costs practice.” Id. (citing Costs in Civil Cases, 30 F. Cas. 1058 (S.D.N.Y.
1852)). Courts have cited, and continue to cite, Arcambel as recognizing the general rule that fees
are not recoverable in the American system. Id.
It is also noteworthy that, even under the American rule, the minor items of cost, including
court fees, copying costs, and witness fees, are recoverable. It is the big-ticket item, attorney fees,
that is not recoverable under the American rule. POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.12, at 621 n.2.
68. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1362–63.
69. Williams, supra note 53, at 859.
70. See POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 617.
71. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
72. Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 10–13.
73. Id. at 13–17.
74. See id. at 28.
75. Cf. Williams, supra note 53, at 860 (“Although designed to provide an indemnity, the
practice of awarding fees to the successful party also serves to discourage litigation, certainly the
trial of an action.”).
76. Note, Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2154–55 (1992) (citing criticisms of the
American rule).
77. See Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60. One definition of a nuisance suit is a suit with a low
probability of success in which the plaintiff’s litigation costs will exceed the amount of the expected
judgment. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Values, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985). Importantly, nuisance suits are not
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American system provides wider access to justice.78 Whether the American
rule’s effect on the level of litigation is more virtue or vice is a normative
question. As Thomas Rowe has observed, “American attitudes . . . tend to
regard litigation as everyone’s right and to emphasize the importance of not
excessively hindering access to justice.”79
The American rule also tends to promote out-of-court settlements as
“making the losing party pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees would
reduce, not increase, the settlement rate.”80 Under the American rule, a
party has an incentive to settle before trial to avoid the legal expenses of
taking the case to trial regardless of the party’s relative confidence in
winning at trial. Under a rule that indemnifies the winning party’s fees,
settlement makes less sense for a party who is confident in her chances of
winning.81 Thus, even though more claims are brought under the American
system of expense allocation, it does not necessarily follow that there are
more trials.82

2. Systems of Attorney Fee Shifting
The second broad category of cost allocation after the American rule is
attorney fee shifting. Under fee shifting systems, the legal expenditures of
the parties are allocated based on the results of the litigation rather than
strictly on which party incurred the expense. Fee shifting schemes
commonly fall into one of two subcategories, indemnity and one-way
shifting. Each subcategory is described in turn in the subsections that
follow.

a. Indemnity, or the English Rule
While American courts allocate legal expenditures based solely on
necessarily frivolous. According to Posner,
A suit is frivolous if it has no basis in law, implying a very low probability of the
plaintiff’s winning if the suit is litigated. A nuisance suit might be a meritorious suit in
which the potential damages were so slight that the net expected value of the suit (that is,
net of the plaintiff’s litigation costs), if it were litigated, would be negative.
POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 620.
78. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1363.
79. Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 658 (citing Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to
the Courthouse Door, 2:4 LITIGATION 27 (Summer 1976)).
80. Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 927, 927 (1988); see
Shavell, supra note 51, at 63.
81. See Shavell, supra note 51, at 65–66.
82. Id. at 65–66 n.39.
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which party incurs them, courts in other common law jurisdictions and in
civil law jurisdictions allocate expenditures based on which party ultimately
prevails in the litigation.83 This system is known as “indemnity,” or
commonly the “English rule.” Under the indemnity rule, the loser of
litigation pays both her own legal expenses and those of the prevailing party.
The rule shifts the winner’s legal fees to the loser to pay, regardless of
whether the winning party was plaintiff or defendant. Consequently, the rule
is also sometimes called a “two-way fee shifting” rule.84
In Thomas Rowe’s theoretical analysis of attorney fee shifting schemes,
he points to “justice for the winner” as the most appealing justification for
the indemnity rule.85 The prevailing party in litigation, this argument goes,
“should not suffer financially for having to prove the justice of his
position.”86 This equitable rationale does not itself justify forcing the loser
to indemnify the winner, according to Rowe. It is possible, even probable,
for a defeated party “to have been justified and reasonable in pressing a
strong but ultimately unsuccessful claim or defense.”87 It does not serve
equity to penalize a losing party for advancing reasonable arguments. In this
way, indemnity may not be fairer or more equitable than the American rule.
Because requiring the loser to pay the other side’s expenses is at least
somewhat punitive, the indemnity rule finds further justification in theories
of punishment and deterrence. To the extent that losing parties lose because
of the wrongfulness of their underlying conduct, indemnity punishes such
wrongful conduct and may deter the losing party, and perhaps third parties,
from similar wrongful conduct in the future. As explained below, deterrence
and punishment are common rationales for one-way fee shifting schemes, as
well.88
A more compelling justification for the indemnity rule is compensation.
The basis for the law of remedies is to make the plaintiff whole. Yet, under
83. Williams, supra note 53, at 859; see POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 617.
84. Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 653 & n.8.
85. Id. at 653–54.
86. Id. at 654.
87. Id. at 655. Rowe notes, however, that in a legal system in which substantive law and
litigation outcomes is generally predictable, it may indeed serve equity to penalize a losing party for
losing. Id. Such a loser should have known better than to continue the litigation and cause the
opposing party to incur increasing expenses. Id. While the British legal system, for instance, tends
to produce predictable outcomes (in part because of its non-political bench and infrequent use of
juries), the American legal system does not. Id. at 655–56 (citing POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at
619; Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to H.H. Nordlinger, in G. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO: AMERICAN JUDGE 150 (1940)). Consequently, the indemnity rule may be fairer in
application in the British system than in the American system.
88. See infra Part III.2.b.
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the American rule, even a successful plaintiff is not truly made whole
because she cannot recover all of her legal costs. Again, per Rowe,
“Undeniably, the American rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s
recovery by the amount of his lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole
idea underlying much of the law of remedies.”89 Indemnity, on the other
hand, ensures that if a plaintiff successfully vindicates a right or entitlement
she recovers her costs of doing so, which she would not have incurred but
for the illegal conduct of the defendant.
Finally, indemnity is often credited with discouraging litigation.90
Indeed, advocates of indemnity consider it an answer to the “caseload
crisis.”91 Steven Shavell’s economic analysis of the indemnity rule indicates
the system theoretically holds down the number of nuisance suits.92
Empirically, however, it appears that indemnity might actually increase the
litigation rate.93 Either way, the indemnity rule generally makes litigation
more expensive because it encourages litigants to spend heavily in
expectation that the costs will ultimately fall to the other side.94 Moreover,
in much the same fashion, the indemnity rule incentivizes more trials than
the American rule.95

b. One-Way Fee Shifting Schemes
The second common type of fee shifting scheme is a one-way shift. In
contrast to the indemnity rule, or “two-way” shift, a one-way shift makes
fees recoverable by only one type of party in litigation, plaintiff or
defendant. While a one-way fee shift can favor either the plaintiff or the
defendant, one-way shifts that favor defendants are rare. The typical oneway shift rewards fees to the prevailing plaintiff only.96
One-way fee shifting schemes are uniquely American. Where they
exist, they are exceptions to the general American rule. Except for

89. Rowe, Jr., supra note 63, at 657.
90. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 53, at 860.
91. POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 618.
92. Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60.
93. See generally Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating
Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990) (concluding that plaintiffs
dropped more medical malpractice claims under an English rule indemnity rule than under the
American rule).
94. POSNER, supra note 49, § 21.11, at 620; see Snyder & Hughes, supra note 93, at 346
(noting empirical evidence suggesting litigations costs are higher under the indemnity rule).
95. Shavell, supra note 51, at 59–60.
96. See Dobbs, supra note 63, at 435–36.
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commercial contracts that included private fee shifts, the American rule
prohibiting attorney fee shifting was practically monolithic until the 1870s.97
Starting around this time, federal legislation began to integrate one-way,
plaintiff-friendly fee shifts.98 The first legislative fee shifts came in the
Voting Rights Act of 1870, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the
Sherman Act of 1890.99 Numerous subsequent state statutes also allowed
fee recovery.100 According to John Leubsdorf, “Legislatures of this period
were beginning to look at realistic attorney fee awards less as bounties for
greedy lawyers and more as aids to needy plaintiffs or sanctions against
corporate defendants.”101 This attitude change accompanied a change in the
type of litigation. In the mid- to late-nineteenth century in America, the
typical lawsuit “ceased to be a businessman’s action to recover a debt and
became a tort suit against a corporation.”102 A second major round of
legislative fee shifts came almost a century later in 1960s and 1970s.
Congress included fee shifting provisions, nearly all plaintiff friendly, in
virtually all civil rights and environmental statutes during these decades.103
Courts of this era also began actively expanding exceptions to the
American rule by, among other things, broadly interpreting fee shifting
provisions and developing the “private attorney general doctrine.”104 The
United States Supreme Court made the private attorney general doctrine
federal law in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.105 In Newman, the
Court interpreted the fee shift provision in Title II of the Civil Right Act of
1964. Title II provides that “the prevailing party” is entitled to “a reasonable
attorney’s fee in the court’s discretion.”106 The Court took up the question
of whether Title II allowed recovery of attorney fees only to the extent the
defendants advanced bad faith positions.107 The Newman Court succinctly
stated the purpose of the fee shift in Title II as follows:

97. Leubsdorf, supra note 63, at 25.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 25–26.
103. Id. at 30.
104. Id.; see, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968)
(interpreting the fee shift in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to award fees not just for bad
faith claims by defendants but also to compensate plaintiffs for acting as a “private attorney
general”).
105. Newman, 390 U.S. at 401–02.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).
107. Newman, 390 U.S. at 401.
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When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to
rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form
only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own ’attorneys’ fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest
by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress
therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees—not simply to penalize
litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be
untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by
108
racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.

Significantly, Newman interpreted fee shifting provisions in federal civil
rights legislation to be more than merely a penalty for defendants. Rather,
fee shifts are intended to reward plaintiffs who bring claims to enforce
federal laws and policies, much like the attorney general does.109 The
private attorney general doctrine has enjoyed wide application since
Newman, including in certain contexts in Kansas law.110
The history of one-way fee shifting clearly indicates three rationales
underpinning these schemes: punishing corporate wrongdoers, affecting the
relative strengths of the parties, and incentivizing plaintiffs to vindicate
statutory rights. Given their history and the rationales used to justify them, it
is no wonder that one-way fee shifts predominately favor plaintiffs over
defendants. This is the case in in most federal civil rights cases. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), attorney fees are recoverable by the prevailing party in
actions under §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and other federal statutes. While the language of § 1988 allows recovery by
either defendants or plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
provision to allow defendants to recover fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was
“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”111 In other words, the fee shift in
§ 1988 is plaintiff friendly. The Supreme Court has three reasons for
108. Id. at 401–02 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See Alexander v. Certified Master Builders Corp., 1 P.3d 899, 906–07 (Kan. 2000)
(applying the doctrine to the remedial provisions of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act); Williams
Foods, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. 99C16680, 2001 WL 1298887, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2001)
(applying the doctrine to the Kansas civil antitrust statutes).
111. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see also Michael T. Jilka,
Attorneys Fees in Civil Rights Cases, J. KAN. B.A., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 42, 42; Dobbs, supra note 63,
at 442–50.
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distinguishing between plaintiffs and defendants: (1) the need to facilitate
the enforcement of civil rights laws through the private attorney general
doctrine; (2) it avoids creating a disincentive for plaintiffs by allowing
successful defendants to collect attorney fees; and (3) when a court awards
fees for a plaintiff, it “is awarding them against a violator of federal law.”112
Consistent with the purposes of one-way fee shifts, plaintiff-friendly
shifts tend to increase the frequency of lawsuits and trials.113 The rare
defendant-friendly shifts, logically, tend to decrease the frequency of
suits.114 Steven Shavell’s conclusion, consequently, would likely be to
institute a one-way plaintiff-friendly scheme in areas of the law in which
higher volumes of litigation are desirable. This is precisely what the
Supreme Court has done with the private attorney general doctrine in the
civil rights context.

IV. ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTS IN THE WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION
STATUTES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
While not every state has adopted a full-blown wage payment and
collection act like Kansas’s KWPA, almost all jurisdictions have codified
some sort of statutory remedial scheme for employees to recover unpaid
wages from employers. Among other things, this fact illustrates the nearuniversality of the public policy supporting timely and complete payment of
wages earned. Furthermore, most of these statutory remedial schemes
involve an attorney fee shift, and most of these shifts exclusively benefit
plaintiff-employees. One can infer at least two broad conclusions from these
facts: a majority of jurisdictions attempt to incentivize employees to bring
private causes of action to recover unpaid wages, and Kansas is in the
minority.
Appendix A contains the results of the authors’ fifty-one jurisdiction
survey (including all fifty states and the District of Columbia) of attorney fee
shifts in wage payment and collection and similar statutes. The results of
this survey are telling. A large majority of jurisdictions have provided for
attorney fees as part of the potential recovery in wage claims. In a nutshell,
of the forty-eight jurisdictions in the United States that have adopted some
sort of wage payment and collection statute,115 thirty-nine (all but seven)
112.
113.
114.
115.
wages.

Jilka, supra note 111, at 42 (citing Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422).
Shavell, supra note 51, at 61, 67.
Id. at 61.
Alabama, Mississippi, and Ohio provide no statutory method of recovery of due and owing
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have included an attorney fee shift in the respective statute. Kansas, along
with Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Virginia are in the small minority of states whose wage payment statutes
include no fee shift.
The most typical type of fee shift in wage payment and collection
statutes is a one-way shift that favors only the plaintiff. These one-way
shifts tend to fall into one of a few subcategories: (a) statutes that require a
fee award for the prevailing plaintiff only; (b) statutes that give the court
discretion to award fees for the plaintiff only; (c) statutes that reward
defendants fees if the plaintiff’s claims are deemed frivolous or brought in
bad faith; and (d) statutes that reward plaintiffs fees except when the
defendant’s violation of the law was the result of a bona fide dispute.
Although much less common, some jurisdictions’ statutes provide for
indemnity of the prevailing party’s attorney fees, regardless of which party
prevails. Only Arizona and Florida have codified this English-style
indemnity rule. Washington and Colorado each have adopted a rule that
operates like an offer of judgment in that fees are recoverable by the plaintiff
only if the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery is greater than the amount admitted
by the employer to be owing.116 Colorado permits the employer to recover
fees when the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery is less than the amount admitted
by the employer.117 Montana has adopted yet another variant of indemnity
in which the plaintiff must be awarded fees if he or she prevails and the
defendant may be awarded fees if he or she or it prevails.118
Below is a table summarizing the types of fee shifts found in the wage
payment and collection statutes analyzed in the fifty-one jurisdiction survey.
This table paints with a broad brush. Many of the fee shifts analyzed are
unique and incapable of being categorized perfectly in this general manner.
It suffices for our purposes here, however, to describe the rough contours of
the types of fee shifts employed by other jurisdictions in their wage payment
statutes.

116. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.48.030.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1).
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214. It should be noted that the Montana statute requires courts
to award attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs except when the action is brought by the commission
of labor.
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It is clear from these results that a consensus exists among states that
employees ought to be able to recover their attorney fees along with unpaid
wages. It is less clear what rationales the majority states have adopted to
justify the fee shift. Likely rationales include the desire to affect the relative
strength of the parties, to incentivize private wage payment litigation to
enforce the law and support public policy, and to punish employers that
wrongfully withhold earned wages. These majority states have effectively
authorized individual aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys
general in enforcing the wage payment and collection laws.

V. THE KWPA NEEDS A ONE-WAY, PLAINTIFF-FRIENDLY ATTORNEY
FEE SHIFT TO INCENTIVIZE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
If it is true, as the Kansas Legislature and Kansas courts have stated,121
that the KWPA is necessary to enforce the “strong and longtime” public
policy of the state to protect workers’ wages, the Act should be amended to
include an award of attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs. At bottom, the
KWPA suffers a peculiar enforcement problem because the class of people it
is intended to protect, unpaid wage workers, is uniquely incapable of
pursuing a private cause of action in court. By virtue of being a member of
the protected class, a person is cash-strapped because she has not been paid
her wages. The legislature entrusted the KDOL with enforcement of the
law, and even granted it a fee shift to make enforcement possible. It appears

119.
120.
121.

Includes jurisdictions with no wage payment statute.
Based on total jurisdictions surveyed, i.e., fifty-one.
See Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1092 (Kan. 2007).
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that the task of enforcing the KWPA is more than the KDOL can manage.
As a result, the “strong and longtime” public policy protecting wages and
wage earners is hollow.
There are three reasons the KWPA must be amended to include an
attorney fee shift favoring prevailing plaintiffs. First, an attorney fee shift is
justified by fundamental fairness. Second, an attorney fee shift would make
it possible for individual employees with small claims—the majority of
people aggrieved under the KWPA—to vindicate their rights and enforce the
entitlements granted by the Act. And third, a fee shift would permit
individual employees to enforce the KWPA as private attorneys general and
thereby improve enforcement and ease the burden on state government.
Before we discuss these reasons in detail, it will be helpful to clarify the
type of fee shifting provision we are proposing. Kansas should join the
majority of states and amend its wage payment and collection act to award
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs. The original bill introduced in the
Kansas House of Representatives in 1973 contained a one-way, plaintifffriendly fee shift. The shift was included in what is today section 44-324.
Subsection (c), the fee shift, read as follows:
(c) Any judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding pursuant to this act
shall include all costs reasonably incurred in connection with the
122
proceeding, including attorneys’ fees.

A one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee shift, like the one originally proposed
in House Bill 1429, is necessary and appropriate to achieve the goals of
fairness to employees, enforcement of the rights protected by the KWPA,
and easing the burden of enforcement on the state.
Recognizing that there is no reason to incentivize employees to bring
meritless claims or claims intended merely to harass or abuse their
employers, we recommend modifying the original one-way fee shift to allow
a prevailing defendant to recover fees under these circumstances. We
propose the following language to accompany the above fee shifting
provision:
If the Court determines that plaintiff knowingly brought and maintained
a groundless action pursuant to this act, then the prevailing defendant
may be entitled to recover from plaintiff all costs reasonably incurred in
connection with the proceeding, including attorneys’ fees.

122.

H.B. 1429, 1973 Leg., 68th Sess., at 8 (Kan. 1973).
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The following subsections explain the reasons for and benefits of such
an attorney fee shift.

A. Fundamental Fairness Demands that the KWPA Include an Attorney
Fee Shift
It is unfair to require a wage-earning employee whose employer has
wrongfully withheld wages to foot the bill for an attorney on an hourly basis
to recover from her employer. This is, however, the only choice most
potential wage payment plaintiffs have. Those who cannot afford to pay a
private attorney hourly—which is likely because they have not been paid—
simply receive no redress. In other words, prospective wage payment
plaintiffs are practically barred from recovering their earned wages precisely
because they were never paid their earned wages. This is unfair. Moreover,
even those employees who manage to find a private lawyer to take their case
and go on to prevail are never made whole. An employee who recovers
100% of her owed wages plus a 100% penalty still likely owes her lawyer
fees. The penalty, though substantial, may not (and usually does not) cover
the attorney fees. A successful plaintiff, therefore, is rarely made whole,
which is fundamentally unfair.
Further, an attorney fee shift is essential to leveling the relative strengths
of the parties in wage payment litigation. Employers that violate the KWPA
by failing to pay earned wages to an employee enjoy important structural
advantages in wage payment litigation. First, employers generally possess
the financial wherewithal to retain legal counsel on an hourly basis. In fact,
employer-violators possess the funds withheld from the employee-victim,
which could be applied to the former’s litigation costs. Second, employers
often possess most or all of the relevant evidence in a case. Discovery,
therefore, is often more burdensome and time consuming for the employee
than for her opponent.
These advantages do not relate in any way to the merits of the parties’
positions. Yet, as a consequence of these advantages, litigation is relatively
less expensive for employers than for employees. A statutory attorney fee
shift would even the playing field by affecting the relative strengths of the
parties. If an employer were liable for its fees as well as the employee’s
fees, the structural cost advantages previously available to the employer
would disappear and so, too, would the unfairness inherent in the current
system.
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B. A Fee Shift Is Necessary to Enforce the Rights Codified in the KWPA
Rights are meaningful only to the extent they can be enforced.
Unenforceable rights are really no rights at all. This is the argument of
Parchomovsky and Stein, cited supra,123 and it is true as it relates to the
rights supposedly protected by the KWPA. Under the current system in
which there is no attorney fee shift for private claims under the Act, most
claims are too small to justify the legal costs necessary to pursue them, and,
as a consequence, lawyers will not take the claims on a contingency. Thus,
unless an aggrieved employee is able to bear the costs of hourly bills for an
attorney, she is unable to bring a claim to enforce her rights under the
KWPA.124 In this common scenario, the effect of the KWPA is nil; the
rights to wages it purports to protect are accordingly nonexistent. The Act is
not accomplishing its purpose.
When aggrieved employees are unable to vindicate their rights to wages
through private causes of action, there is no deterrent to employers from
wrongfully withholding wages. Rational employers will safely withhold an
amount of wages that, while significant to the employee, is insufficient to
justify the costs of prosecuting a wage payment claim. In the status quo,
there is no check on relatively minor violations of the KWPA.
The solution to problems like this one, according to Richard Posner, is
more litigation against the violators of the law.125 Posner says that the more
likely a suit is to be brought to enforce a right, the greater the deterrent effect
of the law.126 Hence, employers who might otherwise withhold an
employee’s wages are likelier to be deterred from doing so if a related
lawsuit is likely. If one assumes, as do the authors and Kansas courts and
lawmakers, that the rights protected by the KWPA are important and should
be enforced, then increased wage payment litigation must be desirable.127
Thus, legal costs should be allocated to incentivize employees to bring wage
payment litigation.128
The most effective way to allocate legal costs to incentivize potential
plaintiffs to bring claims is to award prevailing plaintiffs their attorney fees

123. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
124. This assumes, of course, that the hypothetical employee is unable to seek redress through
the KDOL. As discussed supra, the KDOL pursues very few wage complaints and most often refers
the complainants to private counsel.
125. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. See generally Shavell, supra note 51.
128. Id.
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using a one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee shift.129 This is precisely what most
other states have done to enforce workers’ rights to wages.130 Nearly 70%
of American jurisdictions have adopted one-way, plaintiff-friendly fee
awards for this purpose.131 Kansas should join the majority and enable
employees to vindicate their rights through private causes of action and
simultaneously deter employers from withholding wages in the first place.
Consider the ground-level example where an employer tells her
employee he will receive a bonus of $1,000 by hitting quarterly targets.
After the employee hits his production targets, he is lulled along for weeks,
and then months, without being paid the bonus. Then he gets another job
after the employer refuses to honor the deal. Under present law, the wage
claim is worth $2,000 at most. Yet the documentary evidence to build the
claim—including evidence of similar production bonuses in the past,
internal emails, and contact information of former employees—is in the
employer’s possession. No reasonable lawyer will take this case without a
fee shift. And the KDOL will not undertake discovery to prove that an oral
promise was in fact made. This and similar examples from actual practice
demonstrate that KWPA rights are presently not enforced.

C. A Fee Shift in the KWPA Would Deputize Employees as Private
Attorneys General and Ease the Burden of Enforcement on the State
Government
An attorney fee shift that benefits the prevailing plaintiff would permit
private parties to sue to enforce the KWPA in much greater numbers than in
the status quo. In other words, an attorney fee shift would deputize
aggrieved employees as private attorneys general. The KDOL accordingly
would bear less of the enforcement burden. From the perspective of
aggrieved wage earners, it should not matter how or by whom the KWPA is
enforced, so long as it is. As we argue in this section, however, there are
reasons to prefer private as opposed to governmental enforcement of the
KWPA. First, private enforcement would strengthen the law without
burdening the state’s budget. And second, private enforcement is consistent
with the concept of a smaller, less powerful state government.
The first reason to prefer private enforcement of the KWPA, as opposed
to enforcement by the KDOL or other agency or arm of the state, is that

129.
130.
131.

See supra Part II.B.2.b.
See supra Part III & Appendix A.
See supra Part III & Appendix A.
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private enforcement is virtually free of cost to the state. This advantage is
meaningful, particularly in a time, such as the present, when the state’s
budget is very tight. The private attorney general doctrine, which federal
courts have used as a rationale for awarding prevailing plaintiffs with their
attorney fees,132 was conceived for the reason that the government’s ability
to enforce laws is limited. The primary limits are time and financial
expense.
These limitations, especially financial expense, are a concern for the
State of Kansas in this era of budget restrictions. The first half of fiscal year
2014 has seen steep revenue declines for the State of Kansas.133 Expenses,
on the other hand, have proven difficult to cut, especially for education and
courts.134 The Kansas Legislative Research Department estimated in
January 2014, that, if nothing changed, the state would suffer a budget
shortfall of $900 million by fiscal year 2019.135 This is not an appropriate
fiscal climate in which to increase state spending on wage payment
enforcement. Assuming, as we do, that the KDOL’s modest efforts at
KWPA enforcement are partly a function of the limits of time and money,
there is no reason for optimism as long as the state’s budget crunch persists.
The solution is to privatize enforcement of the KWPA. This can be
done by simply amending the Act to include an attorney fee shift
favoring prevailing plaintiffs, i.e., vindicated wage-earning employees.
Such a fee shift would incentivize private lawyers to take small wage
collection cases and thereby empower individual aggrieved employees
themselves to enforce the mandates (and public policy) of the KWPA,
without need for public spending.136
Furthermore, private enforcement of laws is consistent with the

132. See supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.
133. Brad Cooper, Kansas Tax Revenues Fall While Other States See Rise, KAN. CITY STAR
(May 10,
2014),
http://www.kansascity.com/2014/05/10/5014648/kansas-tax-revenues-fallwhile.html.
134. Peter Coy, Kansas Tries to Shrink Its Way to Prosperity, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-17/kansas-governor-brownbackslab-for-steep-tax-and-budget-cuts; see also Kansas Court Furloughs Possible Under New Budget,
HUTCHINSON NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.hutchnews.com/news/local_state_news
/article_476fe81a-c3ed-11e3-b577-0019bb2963f4.html.
135. Coy, supra note 134.
136. The authors recognize that courts are publicly funded and that, as a consequence,
enforcement of the KWPA through private litigation is not a perfectly “private” enforcement
mechanism. The incremental cost to the public of increased numbers of private wage payment
lawsuits would be substantially less expensive than increased enforcement through the KDOL,
however.
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libertarian ideal of a smaller, less powerful government.137 Consequently,
enforcement of the KWPA by private attorneys general, via a one-way,
plaintiff-friendly attorney fee shift, is consistent with libertarian small-state
principles.

VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the purpose and “strong and longtime” public policy
underpinning the KWPA, the law needs greater private enforcement and
therefore an attorney fee provision. Without an attorney fee shift, aggrieved
employees are unfairly denied an opportunity to vindicate their rights under
the KWPA. They are effectively shut out, as though the Act did not exist.
As a further consequence, the rights codified and supposedly protected in the
KWPA are hollow. A one-way, plaintiff-friendly attorney fee shift would
deputize individual employees as private attorneys general authorized not
only to vindicate their individual rights, but also to enforce the law and
public policy of the State of Kansas. And they would do so without further
expense for the state itself; their efforts would be paid for by the violators of
Kansas law.

137. See generally Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, CATO J.,
Spring 1982, at 55, available at http://www.mises.org/rothbard/lawproperty.pdf (setting forth a set of
libertarian principles by which to reconstruct the law).
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APPENDIX A
The following are the results of the authors’ survey of attorney fee shift
provisions in wage payment and collection statutes in the United States.138
State

Primary
Wage and
Hour Statute
None
Alaska Wage
and Hour Law

Fee
Shift?

Type of Shift

N/A
Yes

Arizona

Arizona Wage
Law

Yes

Arkansas

Arkansas
Minimum
Wage Act
California
Labor Code;
Wage Orders
promulgated
by the
Industrial
Welfare
Commission

Yes

N/A
Modified Indemnity,139 in which
employees are liable for fees only
for bad faith claims140
Under a separate statute, Arizona
courts may award a successful
party in a contract (express or
implied) action its attorney
fees141
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly142

Alabama
Alaska

California

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in
which employees are liable for
fees only for bad faith claims143

138. In researching the fee shift provisions in these various wage payment statutes, the authors
relied heavily on ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BYSTATE SURVEY (Gregory K. McGillivary ed., 2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2013).
139. Alaska has adopted the English-style indemnity rule in which the prevailing party in a civil
case is awarded its attorney fees. ALA. R. CIV. P. 82(a).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(f) (2014).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-341.01(A) (2013).
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
143. CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.5(a) (2010).
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Colorado

Colorado
Wage Claim
Act

Yes

Connecticut

General
Statutes §§ 3171a, to 31-71i

Yes

Delaware

Wage
Payment and
Collection Act
Wage
Payment and
Collection
Law (Wage
Payment Act)
None

Yes

Modified Indemnity, in which the
employee recovers fees if she
ultimately recovers a greater
amount in wages than the amount
tendered by the employer; if,
however, the employee recovers
less than the amount tendered, the
employer is entitled to fees144
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly,145
in which courts require evidence
of bad faith, arbitrariness, or
unreasonableness on the part of
the defendant146
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly147

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly148

Yes

GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-7-2
Payment of
Wages and
Compensation
Law

No

Indemnity under a statute
authorizing attorney fees for the
“prevailing party” in “an action
for unpaid wages”149
N/A

District of
Columbia

Florida

Georgia
Hawaii

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly
(mandatory)150

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-110(1) (West 2014).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-72 (West 2014).
Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 316–17 (Conn. 2008).
19 DEL. CODE. ANN. § 1113(c) (West 2014).
D.C. CODE § 32-1012(c) (2013).
FLA. STAT. § 448.08 (West 2014).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 388-11(c) (West 2014).
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Idaho
Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland
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Wage
Payment Act
Illinois Wage
Payment and
Collection Act
Indiana Wage
Payment
Statute
Wage
Payment
Collection Act
Kansas Wage
Payment Act
Kentucky
Revised
Statutes,
Chapter 337
Louisiana
Wage
Payment Act
Maine
Employment
Practices Law,
Subchapter 2
Maryland
Wage
Payment and
Collection
Law
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Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly151

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly152

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly
(mandatory)153

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly154

No

N/A

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly155

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly156

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly157

Yes

Modified One-Way, PlaintiffFriendly, in which the employee
may recover fees only if the
employer’s violation of the law
was not a result of a “bona fide
dispute”158

151. IDAHO CODE § 45-615(2) (West 2014).
152. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/14(a) (2014). Fees are also recoverable by employees in actions
for owed wages under the Illinois Attorney’s Fees in Wage Actions Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
225/1 (West 2014).
153. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-5-2 (West 2014).
154. IOWA CODE §§ 91A.10(3), 91A.8 (West 2014).
155. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.385(1) (2013); Singleton v. Bravo Dev., Inc., No. 2006-CA002163-MR, 2007 WL 2741945 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2007).
156. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:231(F) (West 2013).
157. 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 626-A, 670 (effective Aug. 2014).
158. MD. CODE ANN. LAB & EMPL. § 3-507.2(b) (2010).
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Massachusetts
General Laws,
chapter 149, §
148
Payment of
Wages and
Fringe
Benefits Act
Minnesota
Statutes,
Chapter 181161
None
Missouri
Revised
Statutes §
290.080163
Montana
Code, Title 39,
Chapter 3, Part
2164

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly159

Yes

Indemnity (applies only to
commissioned salespersons’
claims for commissions)160

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly162

N/A
No

N/A
N/A

Yes

Wage
Payment and
Collection Act

Yes

Modified Indemnity, in which the
employee, if successful, must be
awarded a reasonable fee, but in
which the employer, if
successful, may recover a fee165
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly166
(mandatory)

159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 (2008).
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2961(6) (West 2014); Peters v. Gunnell, Inc., 655 N.W.2d 582,
589-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
161. The wage payment requirements are set forth in MINN. STAT. §§ 181.01 to 181.171, 181.55
to 181.58, and 181.79 (West 2014).
162. MINN. STAT. § 181.171, subd. 3 (West 2014).
163. MO. REV. STAT. § 290.080 (West 2012). Under § 290.080 it is a misdemeanor to fail to pay
wages at least twice per month. Id.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (2009).
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214 (2009); Ramsey v. Yellowstone Neurosurgical Assocs.,
P.C., 125 P.3d 1091, ¶ 28 (Mont. 2005).
166. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1231(1) (2014). The amount of the fee “shall not be less than
twenty-five percent of the unpaid wages.” Id.
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Nevada
Revised
Statutes, Title
53, Chapter
608
New
Hampshire
Revised
Statutes, Title
XXIII,
Chapter 275
New Jersey
Wage
Payment Law
New Mexico
Statutes
Annotated,
Chapter 50,
Article 1
New York
Labor Law
North Carolina
Wage and
Hour Act

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly167
(mandatory)

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly168

No169

N/A

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly170
(mandatory)

Yes

North Dakota
Century Code,
Chapter 3414173

No

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly171
(mandatory)
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in
which the employer may recover
fees if the court deems the
employee’s claim to be
frivolous172
N/A

Yes

167. NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.140 (West 2013).
168. N.H. REV. STAT. § 275:53 (West 2014).
169. Ryba v. Beynon Sports Servs., Inc., No. A-1536-09T3, 2010 WL 4811900, at *6 (N.J. App.
Div. Nov. 29, 2010).
170. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-26(E) (2013).
171. N.Y LAB. LAW § 198(1) & (1-a) (2011).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. §95-25.22(d) (West 2013); Rice v. Danas, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999).
173. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-14-09 (West 2013).
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None
Oklahoma
Statutes, Title
40
Oregon
Revised
Statutes,
Chapter 652175

N/A
Yes

N/A
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly174

Yes

Pennsylvania
Wage
Payment and
Collection
Law
Rhode Island
Payment of
Wages Act
Payment of
Wages Act

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in
which the employer may recover
fees if the court deems the
employee’s claim to be
frivolous176
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly177
(mandatory)

South Dakota
Codified
Laws, Chapter
60-11
Tennessee
Wage
Regulations
Act

No180

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly178

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly, in
which the employee may recover
fees only when the employer did
not have a “bona fide dispute”179
N/A

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly181
(mandatory)

174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.9(B) (West 2014).
175. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 652.110 to 652.445 (West 2014).
176. Id. § 652.230(2).
177. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260.9a(f) (West 2014).
178. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-19.2(a) (2012).
179. S.C. CODE ANN. §41-10-80-(C) (West 2013); O’Neal v. Intermedical Hosp. of S.C., 585
S.E.2d 526, 532 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
180. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-17 (2011) (providing a private right of action for an
employer’s breach of an obligation to pay wages but not providing for an attorney fee shift).
181. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-2-204(b) (West 2014).
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Texas Payday
Law
Utah Code
Annotated,
Title 34,
Chapter 40,
Part 2184
Vermont
Statutes
Annotated,
Title TwentyOne, Chapter
5
Code of
Virginia, Title
40.1187

Yes182

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly183

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly185
(mandatory)

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly186
(mandatory)

No

Washington
Revised Code,
Chapters 49.48
& 49.52
West Virginia
Wage
Payment and
Collection Act

Yes

Virginia provides no fee shift for
a private action for wages, but
does provide a fee shift in favor
of the Virginia Department of
Labor and Industry in collection
actions.188
One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly189
(mandatory)

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly190

182. While there is no fee shift for a private party under the Texas Payday Law, attorney fees
are available for claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel under TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 38.001 and 38.002 (West 2013).
183. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 38.001 and 38.002 (West 2013) (providing for fee shift for
successful contract claims).
184. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-40-205 (2013).
185. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-27-1 (West 2013).
186. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 347 (West 2013).
187. Enforcement of Virginia’s wage payment laws is entirely administrative. There is no
private cause of action for unpaid wages.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(F) (2009).
189. WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.48.030 (2010). Interestingly, Washington’s statutory fee shift
operates like an offer of judgment in that it rewards fees only if the amount of recovery is greater
than the amount admitted by the employer to be owing. Id.
190. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(b) (West 2014).
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Wisconsin

Wyoming

191.
192.

Wisconsin
Statutes,
Chapter 109
Wyoming
Statutes
Annotated,
Chapter 4
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Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly191

Yes

One-Way, Plaintiff-Friendly192
(mandatory)

WIS. STAT. § 109.03(6) (2011).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-104(b) (West 2013).

